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Personal injury protection coverages and
benefits include:
. • . a special damage allowance not
exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 days,
for services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the
injury, the injured person would have performed
for his household, except that this benefit need
not be paid for the first three days after the
date of injury unless the person's inability to
perform these services continues for more than two
consecutive weeks;• . .
Motions for summary judgment were heard by the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup who granted The Phoenix Insurance
Company summary judgment in its favor and denied the motion of
Kim Tanner.

The judgment was entered on May 30, 1989.

No

motions were filed pursuant to Rules 50, 52 or 59. Notice of
Appeal was filed on June 26, 1989 and amended on June 29, 1989.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the No-Fault Household Services Allowance

provide for a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day
of disability or is it limited to $20 per day of services?

The

first interpretation places an aggregate limit on benefits based
on days of disability while the second places a limit on each day
services are received.

There is no dispute over whether the

allowance is limited to services actually rendered or expenses
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the
injured person would have performed for his household.
2.

The following two issues were raised in the Third

and Fourth Defenses of The Phoenix Insurance Company's Answer
-2-

(Record pp. 8-9). However, in its memorandum supporting its
motion for summary judgment, Phoenix appears to deny these are
issues (Record pp. 42-43).

Kim Tanner includes them here since

clarification of the statute is the objective and both were part
of her motion for summary judgment.
a.

Does the No-Fault Household Services Allowance

provide benefits for services rendered by family members that,
but for the injury, the injured person would have performed for
his household?
b.

Does the No-Fault Household Services Allowance

provide benefits for the labor portion of the expense for meals
eaten at a restaurant if, but for the injury, the injured person
would have provided the labor portion of similar meals for his
household?
STATUTORY REFERENCES
The following statutes are believed to be pertinent to,
if not determinative of, the interpretation issues:
1.

Historical antecedents of UCA 31A-22-307(1)(b)(ii):
The No-Fault Household Services Allowance concept first

entered Utah law as part of the Utah Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act, Laws 1973, Chapter 55 and was codified as the
former UCA 31-41-6(1)(b)(ii) which provided as follows:
In lieu of reimbursement for expenses which
would have been reasonably incurred for
services that, but for the injury, the injured
person would have performed for his household
and regardless of whether any of these
-3-

expenses are actually incurred, an allowance
of $12 per day commencing not later than three
(3) days after the date of the injury and
continuing for a maximum of 365 days
thereafter, but if the person's inability to
perform these services shall so continue for
in excess of a total of fourteen (14) days
after the date of the injury, this three-day
elimination period shall not be applicable.
Laws 1979 Chapter 119, Section 1 amended this provision of the
code to read as follows:
A special damages allowance not exceeding
$12 per day for services actually rendered or
expenses reasonably incurred for services
that, but Eor the injury, the injured person
would have performed for his household
commencing not later than three days after the
date of the injury and continuing for a
maximum of 365 days thereafter, but if the
person's inability to perform these services
shall so continue for in excess of a total of
fourteen days after the date of the injury,
this three-day elimination period shall not be
applicable.
Laws 1985 Chapter 242 repealed UCA 31-41-6(1)(b)(ii)
and enacted UCA 31A-22-307(1)(b)(ii) which has not since been
amended.

The text of this statute appears under "Juridiction and

Nature of the Case."
2.
a.

Construction rules:

UCA 68-3-2:
The rule of the common law that
statutes in derogation thereof are to
be strictly construed has no
application to the statutes of this
state. The statutes establish the
laws of this state respecting the
subjects to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings
under them are to be liberally
-4-

construed with a view to effect the
objects of the statutes and to promote
justice. Whenever there is any
variance between the rules of equity
and the rules of common law in
reference to the same matter the rules
of equity shall prevail.
b.

UCA 68-3-6:
The provisons of any statute, so far
as they are the same as those of any
prior statute, shall be construed as a
continuation of such provisions, and
not as a new enactment.

c.

UCA 31A-1-102(2):
The purposes of the Insurance Code are
to: . . .
(2) ensure that policyholders,
claimants, and insurers are treated
fairly and equitably; . . .

d.

UCA 31A-1-20K1):
(1) This code shall be liberally
construed to achieve the purposes
stated in §3lA-l-102 and under other
chapters of the Insurance Code. The
statements of purpose shall aid and
guide interpretation but are not
independent sources of power.
3.

Administrative History.

After making inquiry of the Insurance Department,
counsel is not aware of any rule, order, or administrative law
decision by the Commissioner of the Insurance Department under
UCA 31A-2-201 which directly addresses the issues raised herein.
However, Insurance Department Regulation R540-74-l(D) discussed
an earlier version of the statute.
-5-

The regulation was repealed

November 20, 1988 but is set out here for the Court's reference.
D. Section 31-41-6(1)(b)(ii) . This
subsection provides a $12 per day benefit for
substitute services, whether or not expenses
for such services are actually incurred,
payable for the period of time the injured
person is unable to perform services for his
household.
To determine the eligibility for payment
and the amount to be paid, it is necessary to
verify that:
(1) the injured person customarily
performed the service, and
(2) the injured person is now unable to
perform the service.
The benefit commences not later than three
days after the date of injury and continues
for a maximum of 365 consecutive days after
the date of injury. However, if a person's
inability to perform these services continues
for in excess of a total of 14 consecutive
days after the date of injury, the three-day
elimination period is not applicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is concerned solely with the interpretation
of the No-Fault Household Service Allowance, UCA
31A-22-307(1)(b)(ii).

The statute, proceedings, and disposition

below are set out above under "Jurisdiction and Nature of the
Case."

The facts underlying the request for interpretation were

stated in the Brief in Support of Kim Tanner's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Record pp. 14-15) and admitted in Defendant's
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
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Judgment and in Favor of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Record
p. 41). The facts initially were set out in the petition (Record
pp. 1-2) and admitted in the Answer (Record pp. 7-8).
The agreed facts are as follows:
a.

Petitioner has a substantial interest in the result

of the declaratory interpretation of the No-Fault Household
Services Allowance because she was in a motor vehicle accident on
June 16f 1988 which gave rise to a personal injury protection
claim under this subsection.
b.

The Phoenix Insurance Company will be affected by

this judgment because it is the insurance company which is
initially charged with paying petitioner her personal injury
protection benefits.
c.

Petitioner has filed claims under this subsection

with The Phoenix Insurance Company, which has processed these
claims according to the "Household Services Worksheet" attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.
d.

As shown on Exhibit "A", The Phoenix Insurance

Company has interpreted the No-Fault Household Services Allowance
to place a daily limit on the compensable services and expenses.
For example, the Household Services Worksheet shows $10 of
services on 6/22/88 and $32 of services on 6/23/88.

Ten dollars

is allowed for 6/22/88 but only $20 is allowed for 6/23/88.

For

another example, no allowance is made for days in July and August
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on which no services are shown as received although earlier
services aggregate more than $20 per day.
e.

The Phoenix Insurance Company has allowed claims

for household services of petitioner's husband and for a portion
of the expense of restaurant meals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The No-Fault Household Services Allowance is ambiguous
in that it allows up to "$20 per day for a maximum of 365 days"
but does not state whether it is $20 per day of disability or $20
per day of services.
If the statute means days of disability, then Phoenix
is in error in its interpretation.

Fifteen days of disability

should authorize up to $300 "for services actually rendered or
expenses reasonably incurred" without regard to whether such
services or expenses exceeded $20 on a given day.
UCA 68-3-6 points to prior incarnations of a statute
and directs that current provisions be viewed as continuations of
prior provisions so far as they are the same.

The 1973 household

allowances provision was based on days of disability, which
interpretation should continue in the present statute.
UCA 68-3-2, UCA 31A-1-102(2), and the remedial nature
of the statute mandate a liberal and equitable construction.

The

only construction which is liberal and equitable is $20 per day
of disability.

-8-

The reference to 365 days in "$20 per day for a maximum
of 365 days" implies a maximum of one year and corresponds to the
one-year limit on lost wage compensation.

A one-year limit is

logically consistent with days of disability which tend to be
contiguous, but is inconsistent with days of services which tend
to be non-contiguous.
The No-Fault Household Services Allowance is not
concerned with the source of services.

Services by family

members and restaurants are compensable.
ARGUMENT
The No-Fault Household Services
Allowance Statute is Ambiguous.
The No-Fault Household Services Allowance statute is
ambiguous in that it allows up to "$20 per day for a maximum of
365 days" but does not state whether it is $20 per day of
disability or $20 per day of services.
If the statute means days of disability, then Phoenix
is in error in its interpretation.

Fifteen days of disability

should authorize up to $300 "for services actually rendered or
expenses reasonably incurred" without regard to whether such
services or expenses exceeded $20 on a given day.

Thus, if an

insured is disabled for fifteen days, she could hire a
housekeeper to come every other day to do four hours work at $10
per hour without exceeding the allowance.
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Phoenix interprets the allowance to mean $20 per day of
services.

In its view, the disabled insured who hires a

housekeeper to come every other day at $10 per hour can only
receive two hours of work per visit without exceeding the
allowance.
Prior Statutes Indicate Days
of Disability Were Intended,
UCA 68-3-6 (set out in "Statutory References") directs
that the present No-Fault Household Services Allowance, so far as
it is the same as any prior statute, shall be construed as a
continuation of earlier statutes and not as a new enactment.

The

first such statute known to counsel is UCA 31-41-6(1)(b)(ii),
enacted in Laws 1973 (set out in "Statutory References").

This

provision gave an injured insured a benefit of "$12 per day" in
lieu of reimbursement for expenses to replace lost services and
regardless of whether expenses were actually incurred.

In Wilde

vs. Mid-Century Insurance, 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981), the Court
stated:
The benefit provided under the No-Fault Act
entitled plaintiffs to recover $12 per day for
a maximum of 365 days simply by a showing that
Carrielee was disabled so that she could not
perform household services which "but for the
injury, [she] would have performed for [her]
household." Wilde, supra, at 420.
The 1973 statute was amended by Laws 1979 (set out
under "Statutory References") to limit the benefit to an
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"allowance not exceeding $12 per day for services actually
rendered or expenses reasonably incurred."

The point of the

amendment was to stop providing benefits where no services were
rendered or expenses incurred.

It did not limit benefits to $12

per day of services.
Laws 1985 repealed the No-Fault Household Services
Allowance then re-enacted a similar provision which has remained
unchanged.

This current statute provides "a special damage

allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365 daysf
for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably
incurred . . . "

Once again, it did not limit benefits to $20 per

day (Df services.
Liberal and Equitable Interpretations
Requires Days of Disability.
UCA 68-3-2 (set out in "Statutory References") provides
that the No-Fault Household Services Allowance is to be
"liberally construe with a view to effect the objects of the
statutes and to promote justice."

UCA 31A-1-20K1) and

31A-1-102(2) (set out in "Statutory References") mandate a
liberal construction to "insure that policyholders, claimants,
and insurers are treated fairly and equitably;

..."

A liberal and equitable construction of the No-Fault
Household Services Allowance should avoid the unjust, absurd, and
unreasonable consequences which flow from the "$20 per day of
services" interpretation.

Assume, for argument's sake, that
-11-

housecleaning services cost $10.00 an hour.

If a housewife is

injured in an automobile accident and seeks the No-Fault
Household Services Allowance, she must arrange to have the
cleaner come for only two hours each day (which the cleaner may
not be willing to do) under Phoenix's interpretation.

If she has

the cleaner come for four hours every other day or for eight
hours every four days, her benefit is halved or quartered
although she has received exactly the same amount of service.
Why should an insured be penalized for hiring help once a week
instead of multiple short visits?
Assume again that four helpful neighbors each provide a
dinner on the same day and that each dinner represents $10 of
services.

One dinner is eaten on the first day and the other

three are saved for the succeeding three nights.

Under the "$20

per day of services" interpretation, only $20 is payable even
though $40 would be payable had the neighbors each prepared a
dinner on a different night.
No worthy policy is served by limiting benefits to $20
per day of services.

It penalizes reasonable behavior, traps the

unwary, and creates an administrative nightmare for the injured
party.

Its sole redeeming "virtue" is minimizing the benefits

mandated by the legislature.

Even that "virtue" may be

imaginary, as pointed out in Gulla, below.
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The "$20 per day of disability" interpretation provides
a far more just and reasonable result.

Injured persons have a

budget which is directly related to their days of disability.
This budget can be applied to "services actually rendered or
expenses reasonably incurred" in whatever manner is the most
appropriate under the circumstances.
The Superior Court of New Jersey considered a similar
question in Gulla vs. Allstate Insurance Companyy 180 N.J. Super.
413, 434 A.2d 1158 (1981).

Gulla interpreted a New Jersey

statute providing for no-fault essential services benefits.
Determining that the statute was remedial and was to be given
liberal construction, the court interpreted the statute to permit
recovery of either $12.00 per day for each day of disability,
whether or not payment for services was made on a daily basis, or
$4,380, whichever is less:
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 provides:
Payment of essential services benefits to an
injured person shall be made in reimbursement
of necessary and reasonable expenses incurred
for such substitute essential services
ordinarily performed by the injured person for
himself, his family and members of the family
residing in the household, subject to an
amount or limit of $12.00 per day. Such
benefits shall be payable during the life of
the injured person and shall be subject to an
amount of limit of $4,380.00, on account of
injury to any one person in any one accident.
Defendant contends that this language limits
the plaintiff's recovery to $12 for each day
that actual services were performed. On this
-13-

theory she may recover only $12 a day for
services which cost her $20-$25. It is
plaintiff's position that the statute permits
a recovery of either $12 a day for each day of
the disability, whether or not payment for
services was made on a daily basis, or
$4,380.00, whichever is less. The statute is
remedial; it is to be given a liberal
construction. Ochs v. Federal Ins. Co., 177
N.J. Supr. 19, 424 A.2d 849 (App.Div.1980).
Plaintiff's interpretation satisfies that rule
of construction. Nothing in the language of
the law prevents that reading. It is adopted
here for the purpose of calculating any
recovery to which plaintiff is entitled.
This approach is in the interest of both
parties. Were the statute interpreted as the
defendant suggests, a knowing claimant, who
needed essential services of only one day a
week, would have them performed over seven
short days instead of one long one, recovering
$84 (7 x $12) instead of the one day cost of
$20-$25. Excessive recoveries will not be
permitted under the rule here adopted: only
"necessary and reasonable expenses" may be
reimbursed. Gulla, 1159-60.
Days of Disability is the
Logical Intepretabion.
The provisions of UCA 31A-22-307(1)(b) are directed to
two benefits: compensation of lost wages and compensation for
lost household services.

The lost wage benefit is provided for

"52 consecutive weeks" while the lost household services benefit
is for "$20 per day for a maximum of 365 days."

It would seem

that both provisions are directed to the first year after injury.
If "$20 per day of services" was intended, the benefit
would not be limited to one year after the injury.

It would

instead continue until there had been 365 days of services.
-14-

Such

an interpretation is inconsistent with the clear calendar year
limit on the wage benefit and the three-day waiting period found
in both provisions.
The No-Fault Household Services
Allowance is Not Concerned with the
Source of Replacement Services*
Even a casual reading of the three household services
statutes indicates that they have no restrictions on the source
of replacement services.

As pointed out in Jamison vs. Utah Home

Fire Insurance, 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977) and Robinson vs.
Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965), an insurance
company cannot claim the benefit of services rendered
gratuitously by friends and relatives.
CONCLUSION
The case on appeal, by itself, would be difficult to
justify as an economic activity.

The No-Fault Household Services

Allowance presents, at most, a $7,300 issue to any given insured
and will hopefully be for less in most cases.

In the aggregate,

however, the issue is larger because it affects so many insureds,
most of whom are ill-equipped to pursue this matter in the
courts.

The frequency with which this statute is applied cries

out for authoritative resolution of the fundamental question of
how benefits are to be calculated.
In curing this lack of authoritative interpretation,
the Court of Appeals has an opportunity which the Third District
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Court did not.

This Court's opinion can be publishec in the

usual reporters and become a valuable reference for both
insurance companies and insureds.
The opinion rendered by the Court should take into
account prior legislation on the household services allowance.
It should interpret the statute in a manner that is logical,
equitable, and liberal.

It should determine that the allowance

is based upon days of disability,, not days of service.
Respectfully submitted this J ^

day of November, 1989

TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER

', Jr.
Attorney for Appellant
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